Estranged Notions: Is the Modal Ontological Argument for God a Sound Proof?

Today's post:

Is the Modal Ontological Argument for God a Sound Proof?

Obviously, “No.”

Plantinga and the weak EAAN

While looking up the subject of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN) I found this exchange of posts in 2012 between John Wilkins and Plantinga himself. But my interest was mainly in this form of Plantinga's argument:

The argument has at least two forms, one with a stronger conclusion and one with a weaker. [...] The weaker argument has the conclusion that one who accepts N&E has a defeater for any philosophical or metaphysical beliefs he has—beliefs such as that Plato was right (or wrong) about the forms, or that there is (or isn’t) such a thing as objective right and wrong, or that there is no such person as God, or (Darwin’s example) that “the Universe is not the result of chance”—or naturalism itself. These beliefs are of such a sort that it doesn’t seem to matter, for fitness, for survival and reproduction, whether you hold the belief.

For reasons which will become obvious, I won't discuss the validity of the argument. Instead, let's see where the possible conclusions take us:

Plantinga on "Is Atheism Irrational"

(An original post by me for a change.)

For all the Catholic blog-verse's infatuation with Feser's work, in terms of his significance as a serious academic philosopher of religion Feser is pretty much nobody. The top dog in that particular kennel is generally considered to be Alvin Plantinga, who was just interviewed on the NYT's Opinionator blog by Gary Gutting under the title "Is Atheism Irrational?".

(No prizes for guessing Plantinga's answer to that one.)