These are Augros' answers to the objections posed in his previous post, and almost all of them are just as bad as anyone could expect.
His response to the first objection is as predictable as it is typical of strawman apologetics. Fortunately, it can be completely destroyed on its own terms: when we use our brains in the most reliable and trustworthy way that we've been able to devise after centuries of work, we learn that our brains are not, in fact, entirely trustworthy on matters of logic. This makes Augros' position entirely untenable; if our brains truly were reliable there could be no possible argument that they were not.
Of course the real problem here is the black-and-white thinking—the idea that our brains must either be completely reliable or else we can't escape from Cartesian doubt. Of course the real situation is that our brains are mostly reliable—we can be reasonably justified in believing in the existence of a real world, while remaining skeptical of complex metaphysical arguments.
(Kaas' Law: “When you have eliminated the impossible, what remains may well be more improbable than that you made an error in one of your impossibility proofs.”)
The other arguments are no better (especially the ‘Argument from Pastrami Sandwiches’), with the exception of the final one, against the ontological argument: Augros rightly rejects this argument for some of the standard reasons.