Wednesday, 30 March 2016

Estranged Notions: The “3:10 to Yuma” Proof of God

A post! Only been two whole weeks since the last one…

The “3:10 to Yuma” Proof of God

In this one, Gordon attempts to top Kreeft's “Argument from Bach” with an “Argument from Western Movies”.

Tuesday, 1 March 2016

Estranged Notions: Doubting Jesus: A Catholic Biblical Scholar Responds to Skeptical Questions

Today's post:

Doubting Jesus: A Catholic Biblical Scholar Responds to Skeptical Questions

So here we have Pitre's response to a handful of the questions posted a couple of weeks back, and it's... pretty pathetic.

Many of the questions answered are of course from believers, not atheists, and many of the questions chosen are not actually relevant. Pitre is apparently completely committed to the ‘traditional’ authorship of the Gospels, never mind the extensive contradictory evidence, and he presupposes the literal truth of whichever part of whichever Gospel he wants to use to answer any other question. This isn't scholarship, this is pure apologetics.

Wednesday, 24 February 2016

Estranged Notions: Is It Reasonable to Believe in Miracles?

Today's post:

Is It Reasonable to Believe in Miracles?

Broussard makes a bit of a dog's breakfast out of what is actually a fairly straightforward subject. Hume had it right in what the modern Bayesian recognizes as being the precisely correct way: a hypothesis with low prior probability has to be supported by evidence which would be more improbable were the hypothesis false.

Broussard's examples all either ignore major relevant evidence or make Hume's argument a strawman (or both). Why do we believe that the Big Bang happened? We have evidence that not only would be vastly improbable had it not happened, but which was predicted in advance from theory, which eliminates a whole class of post-hoc justification biases. We don't say that scientific laws can't be revised, because the revised laws must not be inconsistent with the previously established evidence, while new evidence may be inconsistent with the old laws. Hume never said that merely being rare would make it impossible to believe in some event; indeed, he gives examples of the kind of evidence that would justify belief even in highly unlikely propositions.

So Broussard's claim that Hume is setting too high a bar is completely unjustified, and the modern Bayesian knows (as Hume did not) that this can be justified mathematically.

And then the whole thing degenerates into farce when Broussard claims that human activities such as lying or stealing bodies are somehow more improbable than an actual resurrection of a dead person. And the argumentum ad martyrdom is ridiculous: we have no good reason to believe that any church figure from the 1st century was martyred at all, and we especially do not have any reason to believe that of any actual disciple of Jesus.

Wednesday, 10 February 2016

Estranged Notions: Bart Ehrman’s Botched Source

Yesterday's post:

Bart Ehrman’s Botched Source

I am ... confused.

Ehrman's Did Jesus Exist? has been criticized from various quarters for its sloppiness. But Akin here chooses to nitpick Ehrman's sources for literacy rates in Roman Palestine. It certainly seems that Ehrman's handling of his sources here isn't entirely adequate, but that's true of essentially the whole book and it seems odd to pick out this one instance. Akin in turn handles the same source at least as badly, giving a massively over-simplified account of Catherine Hezser's conclusions.

Perhaps Akin thinks he can build some kind of argument based on higher literacy rates, but in fact there are many lines of evidence suggesting that literacy in the region was lower than the Roman average even if the exact percentage can't be precisely determined.

Of course if Akin feels the need to rebut Ehrman's arguments in Did Jesus Exist? then he should by all means continue the project; but somehow I do not think that defending Jesus-mythicism is anywhere in Akin's list of goals.